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Civil Code and Related Subjects
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
PUTATIVE MARRIAGE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The decision in Princev. Hopson' was that under the putative
marriage and community property laws a legal consort has an
interest in property acquired by the putative consort of their
common spouse during the existence of both marriages. In the
writer's opinion, however, the only community in which a spouse,
legal or putative, can have an interest is that between him or
her and the other spouse to the particular marriage; for the
community by definition can consist only of property acquired
by either or both these spouses. 2 If property is acquired by a
third person, as in this case the putative wife, it cannot possibly fall into the community between the legal spouses.3 Both
putative and legal marriages induce the community of acquets
and gains between their respective spouses unless another regime
be chosen by marriage contract. If bigamy is involved and one
of the parties to the invalid marriage is in good faith, there can
be two communities, but not one in which all parties participate.
The legal marriage will induce its community between the legal
spouses, 4 and under the putative marriage laws the null marriage will induce its own community r6gime in favor of the
spouse or spouses in good faith." If the spouse common to both
marriages acquires property, it may seem that the application of
the normal rules would place it in both communities, but, correctly considered, there will be a situation not contemplated by
the legislation. In that event the judge should resort to equity
as directed in Article 21 of the Civil Code.6 But this situation
can never occur where the acquisition is by a spouse not the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writer has commented
only on those decisions which he considers of particular interest.
1. 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956).
2. LA. CIvI CoDe arts. 2334, 2402 (1870).
3. This case is discussed in a student note appearing at page 489 of this issue
of the Review, but the writer feels that its importance justifies double treatment.
4. LA. CIviL CODE art. 2399 (1870).

5. Id. arts. 117, 118.
6. Id. art. 21: "In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal
is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law
is silent."
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common spouse, for in this case the property falls either into
the legal or into the putative community, as the case may require, but not into both.
Even where the common spouse has made the acquisition,
the interests of the parties may be determined according to accepted principles of interpretation. Unless the consort of the
common spouse by the null marriage is in good faith, there is
no community as to him or her, for the putative marriage laws
then have no application.' Given the good faith of this consort
of the common spouse by the null marriage (who for convenience will be referred to as the putative consort) and entitlement
to community rights on the part of the legal consort of the
common spouse (hereafter called the legal consort), there will
be no difficulty in the case in which the common spouse is in bad
faith.' Under the long adhered to jurisprudence, which seems
equitable, the property acquired by the common spouse will be
made available to satisfy the community rights of both the putative and legal consorts to the prejudice of the common spouse. 8
If the common spouse is in good faith, however, then two solutions suggest themselves. Either the common spouse should be
allowed his one-half interest and the other one-half divided between the legal and putative consorts, or each should be recognized as having a one-third interest in the property. The first
solution would be founded on the theory that the share of the
acquiring common spouse is not in dispute, but only the other
share, and that it alone must be divided in some fashion. The
second solution would respect better the several spouses' equality
of good faith predicament.
It would be error, however, the writer believes, to consider
property acquired by the common spouse to fall into the community between the legal spouses simply because their marriage
has not been dissolved. If the legal consort is in bad faith, e.g.,
has knowledge of the putative marriage situation and does
nothing to prevent it or terminate it, then it would seem equitable
that he or she not be permitted to prejudice the rights of the
putative spouse or spouses in good faith. Otherwise there would
be an abuse of the law. Similarly, if the legal consort excusably
believes the legal marriage terminated (in the case under dis7. Id. arts. 117, 118.
8. The initial decision was Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans,
1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
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cussion the legal wife believed herself divorced and had remarried) there is hardly any reason to recognize community rights
in his or her favor, whether or not there is a putative consort
involved. It would seem equitable here to use Article 21 to invoke a putative non-marriage or putative divorce 9 doctrine, a
counterpart of the putative marriage doctrine. Just as it is
proper to give parties the benefit of the effect of marriage if
they believe themselves married in certain cases, so too it would
seem proper to withhold the effects of marriage if parties do
not believe themselves married so as not to prejudice either of
them as to the legal expectancies normal for the state of life
which they putatively possess.
PUTATIVE MARRIAGE

-

GOOD FAITH

What in fact may constitute good faith for purposes of the
putative marriage laws was again considered in Succession of
Pigg.'0 The common husband and woman claiming putative
spouse status lived in adulterous concubinage for seven years
before he fraudulently obtained a divorce judgment and married
the concubine. To claim putative status she of course alleged
good faith. The court of appeal was of the opinion the evidence
indicated bad faith, but the Supreme Court was of the opinion
the presumption of good faith had not been overcome. It seems
that the woman claiming putative wife status knew the man was
married to another then confined in an institution for the insane
and, according to the Supreme Court's opinion, may have understood that under the circumstances a divorce between the spouses
was impossible. The Supreme Court ruled, nevertheless, that
the second wife could rely on the divorce judgment unless she
had personal knowledge it had been procured through fraud
and that proof of this personal knowledge had not been made
against her. In so ruling the court relied on its previous decision in Funderburk v. Funderburk," in which it refused to impute a knowledge of the law of divorce (there of venue) to the
wife claiming good faith. The fact of the rendition of the judgment, therefore, was considered sufficient ground for good faith
on her part. There was no suggestion that she, a person without competence in the law, should have inquired about its valid9. This second term was suggested to me by Mr. Fred R. Godwin, the student
author of the note which appears at page 489, infra.
10. 228 La. 799, 84 So.2d 196 (1955).
11. 214 La. 717, 38 So.2d 502 (1949).
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ity, even if she had previously understood a divorce to be impossible. This decision of course must be distinguished from
those in which the allegation of good faith was based on the
mere statement of the prospective consort concerning divorce
from his legal spouse. 12
SEPARATION AND DIVORCE -

PROOF OF ADULTERY

In two cases entitled Williams v. Williams"s and combined
for trial a husband sought to divorce his wife on the ground of
adultery and to disavow paternity of her child. To provide proof
for each claim he requested that blood grouping tests be ordered,
for if his and the child's blood groups were genetically incompatible he could not be its father and adultery would be established. The plaintiff's request was refused for both purposes.
In refusing to order the test for the purpose of proving adultery
to establish the cause for divorce 1 4 the court said that to prove
adultery "it is necessary to prove the time, the place, and the
co-respondent." 5 If so, this is a requirement imposed by the
Justices themselves, for the Civil Code says no more than that
adultery is a cause for separation or divorce. The matter is one
of proof only, not of substantive law. If the blood grouping test
is scientifically reliable for disproving biological filiation, as
seems to be the case," then there is no reason to reject it as evidence of adultery. Indeed, the test can provide a far more certain indication of adultery than the circumstantial evidence on
7
which reliance usually is placed.'
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION -

DATE MARITAL

RAGIME DISSOLVED

In Tanner v. Tanner s the Supreme Court declared the marital r6gime terminated as of the effective date of the judgment
12. Succession of Thomas, 144 La. 25, 80 So. 186 (1918).
13. 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
14. The disavowal aspect of the decision is considered separately at page
310, infra.
15. 87 So.2d 707, 710 (La. 1956).
16. See SCHATKINT, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS, 164-289 (3d ed. 1953).
17. It is true that the case involved a request to order the taking of a blood
grouping test, not simply an effort to introduce in evidence the result of such a
test. The lower court had refused the request on the basis it had no authority
to order a skin puncture, but the Supreme Court did not make any point of this,
and simply denied the possibility of using the results of the test as evidence of
adultery.
18. 229 La. 399, 86 So.2d 80 (1956). The decision was followed in Messersmith
v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956) and Coney v. Coney, 89 So.2d
326 (La. 1956). In each case the question here discussed was preliminary to
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of divorce or separation and not as of the date of the filing of
suit for separation or divorce. The original opinion of the court
was to the contrary, applying Article 2432, according to which
"the judgment which pronounces the separation of property, is
retroactive as far back as the day on which the petition for the
same was filed," as a provision in pari materia. On rehearing
the court reversed its judgment, inferring that the community
must exist beyond the date of filing suit if Articles 149 and 150
of the Civil Code authorize the wife to demand an inventory of
property in the husband's hands pending suit and forbid him to
incur any debt on account of the community or alienate its
assets in fraud of the wife's rights. In reaching this decision
the court must have ignored the possibility of the husband's
powers over the assets of the community continuing provisionally during the suit for separation or divorce and the r6gime
terminating retroactively for purposes of partition or accounting between the spouses in the event of a judgment of divorce
or separation. Such a solution would be consistent with all provisions of the Civil Code. Article 2432 would be satisfied. The
dispositions of property not in fraud of the wife's rights would
be valid and in the partition of the wife's rights would be satisfied by the money or other values received in exchange for the
community property disposed of by the husband. Indeed, this
solution would have eased very considerably the financial and
proprietary difficulties of persons involved in a suit for separation or divorce. At the same time it would have respected better
the basic presupposition of marital regime law, that the parties
are living together as man and wife, for this condition ceases
to exist in fact as soon as a separation or divorce suit is filed. 19
particular issues, the right of the wife's attorney to have his fee paid "out of
community funds" (Tanner v. Tanner), the ownership of stock dividends declared
pendente lite (Messersmith v. Messersmith), and the finality of an accounting
made before final judgment in the divorce suit (Coney v. Coney).
19. French law recognizes that the divorce is effective as of different dates for
different purposes. Thus the status of the parties is changed as of the day on
which the judgment of divorce is definitive, third parties interests are protected
through the day on which the fact of divorce is recorded on the official registry
of civil status, and property rights between the spouses are fixed retroactively
to the day on which suit is filed. See FRENCH CrvIL CODE art. 252; 2 ENcycLoPlDME DALLOZ, Vo Divorce, §§ 1485-1498 (1952).
The following passage may be
interesting for the problem under discussion: "From the fact of the retroactivity
of the divorce, it follows that the assets and liabilities of the community are fixed
definitely as of the date of filing suit. Property acquired by either spouse while the
suit is pending belongs to that spouse alone and does not fall into the community.
Thus, if the wife had been named administrator and manager of a business conducted in common, she may claim as her own the new business lines she has
acquired [pending suit] and which have no connection with the business (Be-
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ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE

Article 160 of the Civil Code originally provided very simply
that "the wife who has obtained the divorce" may claim alimony
if she is in need. This meant, in effect, that only the wife who
had not been at fault could ever claim alimony, for divorce
based on separation in fact was introduced only by Act 269 of
1916 and until 1898 there was not any way in which the party
cast in a separation judgment could demand a divorce merely because a period of time had passed without the reconciliation of
the parties. Act 25 of 1898, which as amended now appears as
R.S. 9:302, introduced that idea by giving the party cast the
right to ask for divorce two years after the separation judgment if the other spouse had not sought it up to that time. This
same act also provided that if the husband obtained the divorce
after being cast in the separation judgment the wife nevertheless could claim alimony as if she had obtained the divorce (i.e.,
after her freedom from fault had been established by a separation judgment in her favor), but has always been silent on the
alimony rights of the wife who obtains the divorce after the
husband has obtained the separation. Thus a literal interpretation of Article 160 of the Civil Code could have led to the recognition of a claim for alimony after divorce on the part of the'
wife against whom a separation judgment had been pronounced,
but the claim has never been allowed, and this in itself perhaps
is the best proof that Article 160 was understood to mean that
only the wife not responsible for bringing about the marital difficulties could ever claim alimony after divorce.
A parallel bit of legislation, the amendment to Article 160 by
Act 21 of 1928, has not been interpreted so well. This amendment provided that if the husband obtained a divorce on the
ground the spouses have lived separate and apart for a period
of years as required by statute20 the wife nevertheless could claim
sancon, March 8, 1949, D.1949.518, note Ripert). The enjoyment of separate
property having ceased to belong to the community from the day suit was filed,
the revenues of separate property arising or realized during the suit, and the
product of the work of the spouses, ought to be given to each spouse separately.
(Aix, May 10, 1906, D. P. 1908.2.401; cf. Paris, January 18, 1927, D. P.
1928.2.145; Trib. Civ. Pontoise, May 25, 1932, D. H. 1932, 472. More particularly,
the husband must account to the wife for the revenues from her separate property
of which he has enjoyment, less, however, the alimony he may have been complied to pay pendente lite (Req. May 2, 1927, D. P. 1928, 1.44; March 13, 1928,
D. H. 1928.289; Civ. July 26, 1937, D. H. 1937.453).... Interest on the amounts
recovered must be paid from the date of demand (Civ. May 11, 1937, D. P.
1938.1.71)." 2 ENOYCLOP]DIE DAT.oz, Vo Divorce, § 1494 (1952).
20. Now two years under LA. R.5. 9:301 (1950).
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alimony by showing she "has not been at fault." It said nothing
about the wife at fault who secured the divorce on that ground.
From this it has been concluded in the past that if the wife
obtains the divorce under this legislation she is entitled to alimony if she is in need and the question of her fault cannot be
raised. Thus under this interpretation fault is an issue in determining the wife's right to alimony only if the husband has
brought the suit. Unless the amendment to Article 160 was
intended to spur husbands on in the race for demanding divorces, which I doubt, the interpretation cannot be accepted,
for it ignores the real meaning of the original Article 160. The
much more reasonable interpretation is that the wife "who has
obtained the divorce" still means the wife "who has not been at'
fault" and that it is because this meaning was relied on by those
amending Article 160 in 1928 that they failed to specify for the
case in which the wife at fault has obtained the divorce on the
ground of living separate and apart.
The decision in McKnight v. Irving2l perhaps may be interpreted as an expression of willingness to reconsider this misinterpretation of Article 160 as amended. A husband appealed
from a judgment of divorce obtained by the wife, on the ground
of living separate and apart for two years, complaining that
the judge below should have determined the fault of the wife
even though she had not claimed alimony. The Supreme Court
denied this contention on the ground fault was not an issue in
the divorce proceeding as such and could not be determined
without a claim having been made for alimony. It may be significant that the opinion, far from excluding the fault issue for
alimony purposes simply because the wife obtained the divorce,
implied that it might be raised if the wife ever sued for alimony.
The fact that Justice McCaleb concurred in the decree only,
stating that he adhered to the heretofore accepted literal interpretation of Article 160, lends support to this view of what the
majority meant to signify in their opinion. If the writer's understanding of the case is correct, then a husband need no longer
fear condemnation to pay alimony to a divorced wife in need
simply because she has beaten him in the race to the office of
the clerk of court.
21. 228 La. 1088, 85 So.2d 1 (1956).
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DISAVOWAL OF PATERNITY

Problems such as the disavowal question presented in Williams v. Williams 22 raise one of the most important issues
concerning the proper function of a court in interpreting and
applying law. A husband anxious to disavow paternity of his
wife's child asked the court to order blood grouping tests in the
hope that the results would show that he could not be the child's
father. In affirming the lower court's refusal of the request
the Supreme Court reasoned that the Civil Code lists only two
grounds for the disavowal of children conceived during marriage, the remoteness of the husband and wife from each other
at the time of possible conception of the child, and the mother's
concealment of the pregnancy and birth of the child from the
28
husband.
Though the decision follows logically from these two
grounds if accepted as premises in their bare literal sense, it
has the effect of denying disavowal even though the evidence
of non-paternity rejected by the decision is far more conclusive
24
than either of the grounds specified in the Civil Code.
Thus it may be asked whether the literal statements of the
two grounds for disavowal relied upon by the court properly
represent the totality of the law on this subject. Several points
may be observed. First, the Civil Code does admit of disavowal
of paternity in two instances in which non-paternity is indicated
with sufficient certainty for practical judgment. 25 Secondly, if
the Civil Code limits the acceptable evidence of non-paternity to
two specified kinds, it is also true that the newer and more certain evidence, the blood grouping test, was not known at the
time of the Code's redaction and enactment. Thirdly, it may be
assumed that if the blood test and its reliability had been known
in 1808, 1825, or 1870 it would have been listed in the legislation as acceptable evidence of non-paternity. To conclude otherwise is to accuse the Legislature of arbitrarily accepting less
certain evidence and rejecting the more certain. If these obser22. 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
This matter is also the subject of a
student note published in this issue of the Review at page 494, infra.
23. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 185, 189 (1870).
24. SCHATKIN, DiSluTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 164-289 (3d ed. 1953).
25. The Supreme Court referred to "the policy against" having children disavowed. The writer submits there is no such policy evidenced by the legislation,
but only one to make certain that there shall not be a judgment of disavowal

without sufficiently certain evidence of nonpaternity. This should be evident
from the very fact disavowal is expressly permitted. If the reference of the court
is to a "judicially assumed policy," then the court is overstepping

limits of judicial authority.

the proper
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vations be true, then it must be concluded that the statement
of the rule of law found in the Civil Code, though properly
drawn in the light of the state of knowledge at the time of its
redaction, is now revealed as defective. The problem, then, is
whether the judiciary may remedy the defect by interpretation
(here accepting the newly found type of evidence in order to
give full effect to the rule now inadequately specified) or must
wait for legislative action. In the opinion of the writer, justice
to the parties concerned requires that the former course of action be considered a proper exercise of the judicial function.
ADOPTION
In re Amorello 26 is a tale of "delinquency" and "abuse of power" (the terms are those of the Supreme Court) on the part of
the State Department of Welfare in placing a child for adoption.
The Department of Welfare has discretion in placing a child for
adoption once it has been surrendered formally by its parents,
but this discretion most certainly must be exercised with the
utmost diligence and regard both for the child and other persons
involved. In the instant case a child had been given into the
custody of foster parents pending its placement for adoption.
After the child had been with the foster parents three years and
eight months (from age ten months to age four years, six
months), during which time the foster parents themselves expressed a desire to adopt it, the Department of Welfare placed
the child with another couple for adoption. The uprooting of a
child that had lived so long with its foster parents was a serious
blow to the emotions of both which should have been avoided.
The court nevertheless refused to re-uproot the child, because by
the time of decision on appeal she had been with the would-be
adopting parents for fourteen months. The opinion of the court
nevertheless should amount to a strong reprimand and caution
for those charged with executing the adoption legislation.
TUTORSHIP-

ALIMONY DUE DESCENDANTS

The facts in Thornton v. Floyd27 must be stated briefly for a
proper consideration of the problems involved. In the same judgment a wife was awarded a separation from bed and board, given
custody of the children, and the husband and father ordered to
26. 229 La. 304, 85 So.2d 883 (1956).
27. 229 La. 237, 85 So.2d 499 (1956).
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pay alimony to the wife for support of the children. Later the
husband obtained a divorce on the ground of non-reconciliation
of the spouses during a period of more than one year and sixty
days since the separation judgment. 28 Nothing was said in this
divorce judgment of the custody of the children or of alimony in
their favor. The father ceased paying the alimony for the children and the mother sought to enforce payment by motion filed
in the same numbered proceeding in which the separation and
divorce judgments had been rendered and the custody and alimony determined. The Supreme Court ruled that (1) the divorce
judgment superseded all judgments previously rendered in the
proceeding, even those relating to the custody of the children and
the alimony for them, and (2) the divorce judgment put an end
to the numbered civil proceeding itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court decided that all the mother could do (presumably as
tutrix) was to file a suit claiming alimony from the date of
demand.
It is certainly true that a divorce judgment puts an end to the
proceeding and all matters incidental to it. It is also true that a
divorce judgment supersedes a separation judgment and all matters incidental to it. The question, then, is whether it is correct
to consider judgments relating to the custody of children and
alimony for their support, though rendered in the same numbered proceeding as the separation suit, as judgments incidental
to the separation proceeding. The writer is of the opinion they
are not incidental, but independent judgments, and therefore
that the rights which they declare remain in effect even though
the parents may later obtain a divorce.
A separation judgment does terminate parental authority
and give rise to an occasion for the award of custody and tutorship to one parent and hence the articles of the Civil Code on
this subject are found in the chapter "Of the effects of separation from bed and board and of divorce. '29 They are not to be
found, and significantly, in the chapter "Of the provisional proceedings to which a suit for separation or divorce may give occasion." 30 Not being provisional, but definitive, the award of
custody simultaneous with or after a separation suit, though
usually made in the same numbered proceeding, cannot be
terminated simply because the separation judgment is super28. LA. R. S. 9:302 (1950) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 139 (1870), as amended.
29. LA. CIVIL CODE, Book I, Title V, c. V, arts. 155-161 (1870).
30. Id. Book I, Title V, c. 3, arts. 146-151.
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seded by a divorce judgment. This interpretation is confirmed
by the third paragraph of R.S. 9:302, under which the award
of a judgment of divorce to a spouse against whom a separation
had been pronounced, because of non-reconciliation of the spouses
during the one year and sixty days or more since the separation judgment, does not affect the custody rights of the spouse
who obtained the separation judgment.
The termination of the alimony judgment in favor of the
children is even less understandable. It is customary to permit
the spouse seeking the custody of minor children after separation or divorce to ask for alimony in their behalf, but the claim
of the children, though occasioned by the divorce or separation,
is in no way connected with the separation or divorce proceedings as such. Nothing on alimony for children will be found
in the Civil Code's title on separation and divorce. If childrenare entitled to alimony as of and after a judgment of separation
or divorce, it is simply because they are children and in need. 81
If the spouse obtaining custody and tutorship of a minor asks
for alimony for its support, it is really in the capacity of tutor
or tutrix of the child. If it is customary to deal with this matter
in the same suit as that for divorce or separation, and even to
make the award to the wife in her own name rather than to her
as tutrix, it is nevertheless true that it cannot be identified with
the subject matter of the divorce or separation suit or be considered incidental to it.2 2
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
"PUBLIC THINGS"

The Commission Council of the City of New Orleans authorized the Commissioner of Public Buildings and Parks to sell land
comprised within "Commerce Place" but the highest bidder refused to complete the transaction on the ground that the city
could not transfer a merchantable title. The trial judge recognized the city's ownership and right of alienation for private use,
31. Id. arts. 227, 229.
32. Id. arts. 350, 229.

* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

